20c DECEMBER 31, 1951

Peace in Korea? — page 5

New Republic

NEW YEAR, 1952

Arnold Toynbee

Can We Live in Peace?

Captain Liddell Hart

Is Disarmament Possible?

R. H. Tawney

What Do We Stand For?

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Letters

Britain and the US

● I have read your article ("Churchill's Task," *NR*, Nov. 5) with the greatest interest and sympathy. It shows a real understanding both of the difficulties that now confront Britain and of the position of the Conservative Party.

The free world, at the present time, is composed of three main groups: the United States, the Commonwealth and Western Europe. Of these the United States alone is a fully going concern. The Commonwealth is subjected to stresses and strains which bring its whole future into question. Western Europe is still, alas, only a potential

It is already a declared aim of US policy to help build up a European Union. It is also, I believe, a permanent interest of the United States to maintain and strengthen the unity of the Commonwealth and the Empire. How far these two groups, the Commonwealth and Western Europe, can get onto their own feet separately is, to say the least, questionable. In my own view their recovery can best be assured, in the economic field, by the development of an association between them—and more particularly between the Sterling Area and the European Payments Union. The success or failure of such an association will depend on Britain playing its full part as the leading member of the Commonwealth and the strongest of the European states.

It is important at this point to be clear about the purpose of this association. The need for it arises from the fact that the countries of Western Europe and the Commonwealth need capital equipment and raw materials which today can only be obtained from the dollar world, but for which they cannot pay. At present they have to be given or "loaned" the dollars to make their purchases, or else do without. The object of the association between Western Europe and the Commonwealth would be to develop within their territories new supplies of those raw materials and capital goods which can now only be obtained from the United States. The process of developing these new supplies would almost inevitably involve some discrimination against US exports. This is already accepted by the United States administration in the OEEC area and is increasingly tolerated within the Commonwealth. It would now have to be encouraged by the United States in both areas with a view to helping them to bring their trade with the dollar world into balance. Such a policy must naturally be unattractive to those exporting interests who benefit most from Dollar-Aid programs. It should, however, commend itself to the United States taxpayer in so far as it would hold out at least a hope of relieving him of some of the burden he has been carrying. In so far, moreover, as it helped to restore a balance of production between the dollar and non-dollar worlds such a policy would also contribute to a return to free convertibility of currencies.

I have stressed all this because it seems to me very important that, in any consideration of fresh American aid to Britain, both sides should avoid the mistakes that were made at the time of the Washington Loan Agreement of 1945. The purpose of the Washington Loan was to help Britain get on her feet again. It was, however, so hedged about with conditions that the greater part of it was wasted. The insistence upon the return to full convertibility between the pound and the dollar, for instance, proved hopelessly premature, and nearly drained away the whole of the Sterling Area's currency reserves. In the same way, the attempt to break down the system of Imperial Preference has tended to block those policies of mutual economic co-operation between the different countries of the Sterling Area.

A lot of water has flown under the bridge since then, and on both sides of the Atlantic there is much greater realism in the approach to world economic problems than there was then. We have now to recognize that there is a deep-seated unbalance within the Free World and that this unbalance results from underproduction in the Commonwealth and Western Europe leading to exaggerated dependence on the United States. The best hope of correcting this unbalance and enabling the Commonwealth and Western Europe to make their full contribution to the security of the Free World lies in promoting a closer association between them within the framework of the Atlantic Pact and the community of Free Nations. Any American aid that may be forthcoming should be given to underwrite this great design and on conditions that will foster its development.

JULIAN AMERY, M.P.
House of Commons, London

The 1952 Campaign

● Congratulations on your editorial, "The Democrats—Cancer and Cure" (*NR*, Dec. 10).

It is unlikely that the American people will give President Truman another four years in which to cure the cancer of corruption and government-by-crony that so sorely afflicts his present Administration.

On the other hand, Estes Kefauver is firmly associated in the public mind with decency and incorruptibility. He is a man of character and conviction. He is an outstanding liberal—yes, even on civil-rights issues. He is the leading exponent of Atlantic Union. He is for a dynamic foreign policy. He is a friend of labor and of the farmer. He has worked brilliantly over the years for truly free enterprise.

Whatever good Harry Truman has *stood* for, Estes Kefauver will *fight* for. And there is no machine-boss political corruption in his background. He should be the next President of the United States.

STEWART PATTERSON
Chattanooga, Tenn.

● In these critical times, our nation deserves the optimum leadership available. Most of the people of California, at least, believe Gov. Earl Warren to be the best candidate that the GOP could

(Continued on page 4)

Bandwagon

The Little Red Hayloft

Sex-appeal training for farm boys may be a solution to stopping the migration of girls to the cities. – *From the Little Rock, Ark., Gazette.*

Only 359 More Shopping Days . . .

Communist publishers announced today that the price has been cut on Stalin's biography for the holiday trade. – *AP dispatch from Berlin.*

Business as Usual

Directed by Anthony Bushell, *Angel with the Trumpet* is the story of the decline and fall of the Austrian-Hungarian empire, shown as the background for the story of a famous piano-manufacturing firm. . . . – *Press release from Snader Productions.*

Hold That Line!

Fearful lest college football fall "within the eager clutches of rapidly expanding federal controls," General of the Army Douglas MacArthur warned last night that the sport must be kept free of governmental regulation or it will become a plaything of politics and a pawn for greedy patronage. – *From the New York Times.*

Our readers are invited to contribute; $2 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, c/o New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – The Editors.

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New Republic

CONTENTS FOR DEC. 31, 1951

5 Hope, Disappointment and Peace An Editorial
6 The Week:
6 Atoms on the Table
6 Justice in Cicero
7 Africa Changes Masters
7 Upholding the Law
8 Outside America
9 The Sword of the Spirit, by R. H. Tawney
11 Is Disarmament Possible? by Captain Liddell Hart
14 Can We Live in Peace? by Arnold Toynbee
16 The Greatest Adventure in Democracy, by Krishnalal Shridharani
17 Harold L. Ickes
18 Books:
18 "Reunion and Reaction," reviewed by George Dangerfield
19 "The Face of Spain," reviewed by Waldo Frank
20 Western Approaches, by Stanley Cooperman
21 Music
22 Movies

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WASHINGTON WIRE

CLAWING our way out of heaps of pink Christmas wrapping paper, we find that there are plenty of world problems left. We suspected it. Santa Claus has jingled away, but Winston Churchill arrives next week and Congress thereafter.

Could it just be our imagination, or could it be that it is harder this year to switch off the electric train and return to glare-ice and grim reality?

All the newspapers feel strongly about the horrid steel workers who want a big pay increase. In all conscience, any steel stoppage now is a disaster. Steel production is just beginning to pick up, setting a record of 100 million tons a year, while at the other end of the line weapon production—after a slow start—is just beginning to swell. How much stronger however would the case of the newspapers be, who now denounce the steel workers, if they themselves had fought harder for economic stability! It is hard for the worker to understand why he shouldn't ask for higher wages when the Capehart Amendment guarantees higher prices for manufacturers as fast as costs rise. Where were the present critics of the steel workers when Congress passed the Capehart Amendment? There is no Capehart Amendment for the housewife whose costs seem to be rising all the time. This situation does not, of course, justify unreasonable labor-wage demands. But Congress inevitably paved the way for what is now happening when it weakened price controls, jumped rents and blocked price rollbacks.

With baited breath Washington waited for Truman's "drastic" action to clean up corruption. The job could not be exaggerated; it was to restore public confidence in federal officials. Friends of the Administration found little comfort in the President's first petulant attack on correspondents in his press conference after the hurried return from Key West. It was a damaging display of temper. Then Federal Judge Thomas Murphy was called in. Maybe Murphy is the answer. But the first reaction was disappointment. In the Teapot Dome scandals Coolidge brought in two prosecutors of national reputation from outside his administration—Roberts and Pomerene. Those who know Murphy place confidence in him, but he has the handicap of being a recent Truman appointee, who is only known nationally as the prosecutor in the Hiss case. Nor can the public have complete faith in the FBI in this kind of affair. The FBI is a subordinate part of the Justice Department which itself is under investigation. Truman shows no intention of getting rid of the second-raters around him who permitted the conditions to arise which now need to be cleaned up.

In watching the King Subcommittee's inquiry at firsthand, we have been struck by the bland silence which affects two aspects of the affair. First, there is the make-believe that the pressure exerted on government workers comes solely from outside the government, whereas the fact is that much of it comes from Congressmen. It is like a play to watch government witnesses drop in diplomatic phrases about the activities of Congressmen while the committee glares down at them balefully as though to dare them to give names. A witness comments softly that Rep. Frank W. Boykin was "particularly zealous in supporting his constituents' cause," and everybody knows what is meant.

A second fascinating nuance is the relationship between the hard-working, poorly-paid lifetime civil servant who does his job as well as he can, and the political patronage appointee who, under our ruthless system, is dropped down beside him, generally at better pay and often as his superior. They work

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together in the same office, each knowing the other's status. The astonishing thing is the amount of teamwork under this queer arrangement. The professional and often well-educated workers are loyal to the drones, accept the latter's limitations, make allowances for them and try conscientiously to cover up. So far, we have never seen this curious relationship explored in print.

There is increasing evidence that Truman and Taft are on opposite ends of a political see-saw and that as Truman's stock sinks, Taft's ascends. This is unfortunuate for supporters of Eisenhower. Ike is the dark horse, but political parties don't trot out dark horses save in moments of emergency. The GOP named Wendell Willkie only as a last-hope candidate against Roosevelt; when they thought victory certain—as after World War I—they named the "regular" Harding. Republicans are more and more persuaded today that it is going to be a walk-away in 1952, and Taft managers are cashing in on the fact. They are lining up delegates fast, and the Ike supporters are badly worried. The GOP regulars will name just as conservative a candidate as they think they can get away with, and Taft satisfies them. The more Truman's prestige drops, the less reason they see for picking an outsider like Eisenhower.

As a result of the strict scrutiny of foreigners trying to enter this nation, three world meetings scheduled originally for the US have been transferred to other countries. The International Red Cross has moved its convention to Canada; two other meetings are being sponsored by the United Nations—but not in the United States. Officials of these gatherings don't dare subject foreign representatives to the humiliation of having their views cross-checked or being rejected on vague grounds. This situation has come about, of course, under the Internal Security Act sponsored by Senator McCarran. The act includes a definition of "undesirable" that might exclude Churchill, if the latter's dangerous approval of the British national health-insurance scheme were put to a test.

Washington T.R.B.

CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 2)

nominate for President. This is not simply loyalty to a local product. As a vote getter, Warren has few if any equals. A few years ago he was almost unanimously elected Governor in *the* primary by both parties over what many people thought would be a strong opponent. He has been returned to office more often than any other governor in the history of this state. As a candidate he was never defeated, unless we count the 1949 Presidential election and this should hardly be counted against him since people do not stop to scratch a ticket between the nominees for President and Vice President.

While there has been some criticism of former Attorney General Howser's regime (an elective office), no hint of corruption has attached to Warren. His crime commission has done much to stop or eliminate criminals trying to establish themselves in California. He is sometimes referred to as somewhat liberal or progressive, but is more in the middle as compared to former President Roosevelt. He seems to have a true conception of real Americanism. He has never been known to pat Senator McCarthy on the back nor is he under obligation to him so far as is known. He voted against establishing the much publicized loyalty oath for the faculties of the state universities, although in the minority and it took some courage for him to do so. The regents have now eliminated this oath and the Supreme Court has nullified it.

Governor Warren is, as he says, "no socialist" but he does "believe in social progress" and his record supports that statement. He quite correctly points out that, judging by the past 20 years, no stand-pat or reactionary candidate can expect to be elected by either party. Obviously, he would be easier to elect than to nominate: as the question is: has the old guard learned anything from the past 20 years? If so Warren is likely to be nominated.

Warren is of a deliberative type of mind and in this respect, somewhat like Lincoln. He would not be likely to plunge the nation into a war on the spur of the moment. He may not be a Lincoln or even a Teddy Roosevelt, but he has executive ability and integrity; and his appointments generally have been good. This writer really expects Warren to be nominated for it seems very doubtful if Eisenhower will run. Then there is good reason to believe that Dewey, Duff, Lodge and those promoting Eisenhower will turn to Warren rather than Taft.

Without repeating published data on Taft, it should be noted that he evidently will be under obligation to McCarthy for help in the Wisconsin primary and it is possible that McCarthy may be defeated for re-election. Anyway, Taft if elected, would be under pressure to name McCarthy to his cabinet, perhaps as Attorney General, from which position the Apostle of the Big Lie would be in line for the Supreme Court. This possible consummation of political events is not at all fantastic. To date, Taft has never repudiated McCarthy or McCarthyism.

In regard to the Democratic ticket, both Sens. Estes Kefauver and Paul Douglas are getting some favorable publicity here and either would doubtless make a good President. It seems doubtful if President Truman will, or should, run, or if he could beat Warren; and in view of the scandal-ridden Bureau of Internal Revenue and the war in Korea, and regardless of current prosperity, it is debatable if he could, as he thinks, win over Taft unless conditions change considerable before election time.

Escalon, Calif. C. P. STEVENS

A Carver Memorial

● I wish to thank the *New Republic* for its support of the Carver Memorial. This summer the federal government took title to the Missouri birthplace of Dr. George Washington Carver as the first national monument to an American of African descent, the first to any American solely for service to agriculture, and the first in world history, we hope, to be dedicated to interrace peace and progress.

Plans have long called for a replica of his birthplace cabin as a symbol of American opportunity, facilities to show the nature of Carver's contribution, and an annual rededication on a world hookup, with speakers representing different races and nations but always keynoting interrace peace and progress. "Interrace" refers to all races." Progress" means we are not trying to freeze any status quo.

London, England RICHARD PILANT

To End the Cold War

● In your issue of December 3, the Rev. Laird W. Snell in effect asks—What propositions toward an abatement of the Cold War the US could present which would have any least chance of gaining consideration by the Kremlin? "Are there any such propositions?"

I have sent him a copy of the Policy Statement of the United World Federalists and called his attention to the wonderful little book, *Plan for Peace*, by Grenville Clark. If anything can adequately answer the $64 question—"But what about Russia?"—this book does. . . .

La Mesa, Calif. HENRY C. MCILVANE JR.
Capt, USNR, Ret.

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HOPE, DISAPPOINTMENT AND PEACE

THIS CHRISTMAS was surely one of the most poignant in our memories. Very few Americans have lived through the ordeal of the 11,000 families for whom, in Christmas week, sons and lovers declared dead sprung to life, while others believed well were not listed among the living.

Eleven thousand Americans were lost in the tides of battle that swept across Korea. Many were soldiers fatally wounded, or killed, whose bodies could not be recovered during swift retreats. Perhaps 6,000 to 7,000 were captured and imprisoned. While the Communists refused to permit the Red Cross to account for these men or to aid them, they released groups of names from time to time, for purposes of propaganda.

From many sources it seems probably that about one-half of the prisoners previously reported by the Communists are alive today. If that proportion holds for all American prisoners, then the list of 3,198 names published by the Communists is probably a true list of those living today. Further evidence that the list is final is suggested by the inclusion of Maj. Gen. William Dean whose name would be withheld longest.

More than 3,000 prisoners remain unaccounted for. The belief that they were murdered may prove justified. But we must not rush to conclusions. The attrition of exposure, illness and hunger during two harsh winters in Manchuria and North Korea seems certain to loom larger as a destroyer of life than deliberate action.

Far worse, at first sight, than our losses are the apparent losses of the South Koreans. The government of the Republic reported 88,000 men as missing; 7,125 are said by the Communists to be held as prisoners. Happily, these estimates are unreliable. In the disasters that overcame the ROK armies entire regiments and even divisions were reported as missing. In many cases the majority of individual soldiers, being Koreans, were able to work their way south across the lines. Many rejoined the ROK armies to fight again. The majority of those captured were almost certainly impressed into service with the North Korean armies just as in China, Nationalist soldiers and units were integrated in Communist armies. The 88,000 is probably a total figure of men listed as missing at one time or another, not a net figure of the South Koreans who are believed to be missing today.

Many Americans will want to punish the Communists for negligence. Others will be ready to give in at many points to secure the early return of those whose names have suddenly come so close. Where can we yield? For example, should we release our 110,000 prisoners to Communist enslavement in exchange for the 7,100 whose return we seek? There is grist to fill the mills of demagogues from now through November in every decision that faces us in Korea.

For this reason again, we want briefly to review the course of negotiations so far.

If there can be criticism of the UN attitude so far, it is that we have acted as if we were negotiating a military victory, not a military stalemate in Panmunjon. Our natural tendency to arrogance, since we have never dealt with an enemy on equal terms, has been hardened by the excesses of our press.

The truth is that almost every concession in the negotiations so far has been made by the Communists. First they conceded defeat on the 38th Parallel; then on the withdrawal of all troops prior to the cease fire, then on the prohibition of build-ups of troops during the negotiations. The proposal for mutual inspection by representatives of neutral nations, greeted with derision by our newspapers, was in fact an acceptance of the principle of inspection which we have pressed for and the Communists at first refused.

Obviously an aggressor must be punished. Obviously the harder terms we can win in the negotiations, the better it will be. Looking beyond the human costs of war, however, peace is clearly in our interest. Peace, on the terms already blocked out, will realize the aims of the UN which set out to repel the aggression. On the same terms it is a major defeat for the Chinese and Korean Communists who swore that they would expel the "invaders" from all of Korea. Given any independence North Korea will gravitate to the Republic, largely on the Republic's terms. If all semblance of independence is denied who will control North Korea? The Russians will claim historic hegemony; the Chinese must assert their prior right, based on their war effort. For China and Russia, peace can be the beginning of a new struggle.

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THE WEEK

ATOMS ON THE TABLE

After the longest debate in UN history, in which the Western proposals prevailed by the usual deceptive overwhelming majorities, the UN General Assembly Political Committee has wearily agreed to the setting up of yet another commission to study the control of atomic energy. The New Disarmament Committee will seek, as have its predecessors for five years, to achieve a compromise between the Soviet proposal for immediate prohibition of atomic weapons and the US insistence that such a model convention be backed up by enforcement and inspection powers. In essence the decision means that the deadlock will continue, although everyone realizes that world opinion demands at least seeming attempts at settlement. Significantly, the Soviet bloc, while opposing the committee's instruction to the commission, supported the provision which established it.

The pattern of the 44 to 5 vote, with 10 Asiatic countries abstaining, made clear that the discussion did not escape the rigidity imposed by the traditional UN lineup. The final decision provided the West with another one of those empty triumphs in which a procedural victory faintly glosses over the lack of substantive gain. The commission is instructed to work toward establishing acceptable administrative machinery for administering the gradual stages of disarmament envisaged in the Western plan. But even if its particulars were agreed to, the enforcement machinery could hardly operate automatically, as Acheson suggested in a naïve moment at Paris. Its members would also be likely to make their decisions by 44 to 5 votes.

Because of lack of achievement toward its control, the atom continues to be a threatening symbol to many peoples, especially those who cannot follow the devious conversations in the UN. With the Soviets parading behind the slogan of "Ban the Atom bomb," we may by default be appearing to the world as the aggressive force. Certainly the Paris proceedings have not served to reverse such impressions. Some experts now believe that we should agree to a treaty prohibiting use of atomic weapons even though we realize that its significance would be purely psychological, and probably lead to future disllusionment. However, the chance remains that outside forces might insure the treaty's being observed. Then it might be possible to work toward the more sure-fire guarantees which the West rightly insists should be part of any *real* control system.

JUSTICE IN CICERO

For the first time north of the Mason and Dixon line, an 81-year-old federal statute has been invoked against the failure of local authorities to act against racial disturbances.

The president, attorney, fire chief, police chief and three policemen of the town of Cicero, Ill., have been indicted for failing to disperse a racist mob that destroyed an apartment building contaminated by the attempts of a Negro couple to move into this all-white, industrial suburb.

The charge is based on an 1870 statute aimed at racist Southern officials by Reconstruction Radicals: that under color of law—that is, under the pretense of carrying out their duties—Cicero officials deprived the couple of their constitutional right to live where they choose. The officials were also slapped with a general charge of criminal conspiracy.

Both offenses are misdemeanors—punishable only by a $1,000 fine and a year in prison. Indictments providing the more severe penalties for conspiracy against civil rights, based on another 1870 statute, are rarely upheld by the courts and were not sought in this case. The federal law contains no provision for the removal of guilty officials, and the competent county authorities have refused to act.

Federal action may spur the laggard conscience of a Chicago long too complacent in the face of rising racial tensions. For last July's rioting in Cicero was only one in a series of mob actions against Negroes who have dared to try to move into white neighborhoods. And local officials and, to a large extent local opinion, have condoned not only the motives but the actions of the rioters.

Last July, newspapers around the world carried the story of how mobs kept Harvey Clark, a college graduate, from moving into his new apartment in Cicero. Nineteen white families fled in terror as rioters broke through the inadequate police lines and wrecked the building. For three days violence raged, with entire families including infants still in their mothers' arms joining the crowds of up to 5,000 persons who enjoyed the spectacle.

County officials first refused to act. Then, embarrassed by universal press condemnation, they ordered a grand-jury investigation. Only six indictments were returned—against the police chief for failing to break up the riot, and five others, later dismissed.

Regrettably, the action of the local grand jury expresses the popular feeling that the police were not at fault: they could scarcely be expected to fire on their neighbors, and besides, the crowd was too big to handle. Actually the blame lies with the Negroes, your white Chicagoan says: they knew they weren't wanted, so why did they try to move in.

As in so many cases, only federal action seems possible. Over 100 rioters were arrested at the scene. When their cases finally were called in Cicero police court, all but a handful were discharged.

The indicted town officials are now to be tried in the federal courts, but a crowded docket will probably delay this until next summer. Another federal Judge, who issued an injunction ordering town officials to protect Clark and his property, will decide whether the Cicero officials are in contempt of his order and whether Clark is entitled to $200,000 damages.

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AFRICA CHANGES MASTERS

With the colonial powers' prestige crumbling throughout the continent, Africa today faces possible subservience to a new set of masters—the ambitious, second-rate powers who have up to now only shared in its rule. In the north, Egypt is seeking to carve out a domain from the Sudan, Libya and neighboring areas. But by far the most ambitious of African powers is Dr. Daniel Malan's Union Government in Pretoria. For years now, the nationalist Boer-dominated government has been planning the annexation of the various sparsely-populated territories which border her on the north, west and east. With British power declining, all signs point to a rapid realization of these plans.

The latest indication of the Union Government's designs is its trusteeship administration of Southwest Africa. Not only have the South African delegates boycotted meetings of the Trusteeship Council, but their government has refused exit permits to the tribal representatives who launched the complaints. Hosea Kutako, the Herrero tribal chieftain, has simply not been allowed to take up the Council's invitation to present the natives' case, which so far has been made almost single-handedly by Michael Scott, their clergyman friend.

The Malan plan for South Africa's national aggrandizement is based on the almost outright enslavement of the native population. It seeks to subject the people of the new territory to the same down-trodden status to which the Union's own blacks are now relegated, and to maintain the economic and political control of the white minority by systematically exploiting and denying education to the native majority. Southwest Africa is by no means the only territory Malan hopes to absorb. Next in line are the three under-developed British Protectorates of Basutoland, Beachuanaland and Swaziland. In vain have leaders of these three Bantu tribes attempted to get British assurance that they would not be handed over to the Union. A delegation of tribal chiefs which visited Britain several months ago failed to get satisfaction from their talks with the King and leading British officials.

What they fear is that Britain, which has always taken care of their troubles, is now too weak to put up any determined resistance to Malan's *Drang nach Norden*. Malan has openly stated that he intends eventually to make South Africa an independent nation, breaking with the Commonwealth and with Britain, which he considers politically "decadent." The tribal leaders saw many indications that the British may well be ready to sacrifice them in an attempt to appease Malan and prevent his leaving the Commonwealth.

"This is a very bitter issue with us," said Nchee Nchee, adviser to the tribal delegation, as it left England disheartened. "If Britain lets us down, it can only be regarded as such a breach of faith as has never before been committed in the history of British rule in Africa. All this dilly-dallying with Africa over the future of the protectorates fills us with suspicion and alarm. Malan has asked that the negotiations in this matter be published, apparently with the idea of showing how near Britain has already come to handing the three protectorates over to him. . . . If such a thing comes to pass we will fight to the last man, because we know we shall be fighting for both political and cultural survival."

UPHOLDING THE LAW

"Southern justice," seemingly, is supplying Radio Moscow with ample propaganda fodder, and the chief suppliers appear to be local police officials sworn to uphold the law. The cold-blooded killing of one Negro prisoner and the shooting of another by a race-hating county sheriff on a lonely country road in Central Florida last month, plus the recent killing by a special deputy sheriff of a Louisiana Negro who had been seeking the right to register and vote, have provided juicy material for Soviet propagandists.

The Florida slaying has had its international repercussions. Delegates at the United Nations Assembly meeting discussed it and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky made it the subject of a bitter speech attacking the United States and its racial policies.

The shooting of the two Florida prisoners, whose death convictions were reversed by the US Supreme Court last April, took place as Sheriff Willis McCall, alone with a second car following, was transporting them from the State Penitentiary at Railford to the town of Tarves for hearings on a new trial. He claimed that Walter Irvin and Samuel Sheppard "attempted to escape." He killed the latter; Irvin, who played dead with three bullet wounds in him, survived. An investigation by local authorities exonerated the sheriff in the killing.

Thurgood Marshall, counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, sums up the case to date: "As matters now stand, two Negroes have already lost their lives as a result of this charge of 'rape' of a white woman; one being killed by a sheriff's posse and one by Sheriff McCall. Another is serving a life sentence. The fourth, Walter Irvin, although shot twice in the chest and once in the neck, must still stand trial and face the threat of the electric chair."

Irvin, the last of the four accused, will now be tried in Ocala, in neighboring Marion County, on January 14. Judge Truman J. Futch of the Lake County Circuit Court has barred Thurgood Marshall and his assistant, Jack Greenberg, from taking part in the case because he claims that the NAACP has stirred up trouble in the community. Two Orlando attorneys, Alex Akerman Jr. and Paul Perkins, who represented the defendants in their original trial in 1949, will continue as counsels for Irvin.

In Opelousas, La., Department of Justice officials are investigating the November killing of John Lester Mitchell, "with a view to determining what action would be warranted." Lester, one of three Negroes who had filed suit in the United States District Court for the right to vote, was slain by Deputy Sheriff David Lanclos after he left a night club on orders of the officer.

No action is presently pending, however, against either the Florida or Louisiana killers.

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Outside America

THE MENACE OF DE GAULLE

Soon after Gen. Charles de Gaulle arrived in London in 1940 he confided in a prominent French exile, who had come to offer his services, that he was eager above all to create a French government-in-exile with at least the form of legal sovereignty. Surely, his visitor said, the creation of a French army was needed; but why a government?

"To protect France against her enemy, indeed to save France from her enemy," the General explained.

"I should have thought," the visitor commented, "that we needed an army against the Germans, not a government."

"You do not understand," was General de Gaulle's reply. "France is fighting Germany, but France's real enemy has been and is Great Britain."

The anecdote is authentic and throws some light on the thinking of the man who may become the head of the French State. His recent speeches attacking the Schuman Plan, the Pleven Plan, the European Army and General Eisenhower suggest that, in his opinion, although France is fighting Communism and, by extension, preparing to resist the Soviet army, her real enemy is Great Britain's heir as leader of the English-speaking world—the United States.

The notion bespeaks even less clarity and soundness about France's real interests and foreign policy than do some of Senator Taft's curious (and dangerous) aberrations about America's interests and foreign policy. Yet it cannot be brushed aside as anachronistic nationalist idiocy, nor can it be neglected.

General de Gaulle commands the largest number of votes in the French Assembly. Even if the Rally of the French People does not succeed in making him head of the government—and, if his views of constitutional "reform" prevail, head also of the state—it can prevent any other government from functioning effectively. Moreover, it can slow up—and even put off indefinitely—the evolution of the European Army and any form of European Federation.

This is so because de Gaulle has taken a position in negation that makes him a *de-facto* ally of the French Communists in foreign policy, and that may even bring to a coalition of votes against the European Army some of the left-wing socialists and also some of the right-wing nationalists. The harsh fact is that the French aspirant to what he calls glory and grandeur has succeeded in doing precisely what Senator Taft is trying to do in the United States—he has made foreign policy a campaign issue, and therefore given the Communists what they wanted all along and could not get for themselves.

The European Army still has a chance of coming into being; how good that chance is—or how bad—should be seen in the crucial weeks from now until the Lisbon Conference of NATO in February. During that period, the governments of France, Britain and Western Germany which support Atlanticism, with its corollary of close association with America, will be subjected to a domestic political cross-fire both from the non-Communist Left and from the nationalist Right.

Much depends on the result of Winston Churchill's visit to America. Much also depends on the development of the role of General Eisenhower, who has now clearly identified himself with the goal of the European Army. Of Eisenhower's speech at the Rome Conference of NATO, Maurice Ferro, the Washington correspondent of *Le Monde* of Paris, wrote:

> The Atlanticists found that their supreme commander had magnificent talent as a preacher. They expected a military exposition. . . . In lifting himself above the discussions to the point of identifying himself with the Apostles of Christian civilization, he adopted for himself the responsibilities which America takes unto itself in the conduct of affairs of the free world. The speech which Eisenhower pronounced in Rome before the Western cabinet ministers and representatives of the press was his first as candidate for the Presidency of the United States.

Before this thinly-veiled malice lies the fact that European neutralism has now adopted a new disguise—nationalism. And anti-Europeanism has become the cloak for anti-Americanism.

General de Gaulle who, despite his protests, is a man of the far Right, says that either the European Army means "the end of the French army or else it is a hoax." Dr. Kurt Schumacher, leader of the Western German Social Democrats, condemns both the Schuman and Pleven Plans. If the European Army is formed, he says, "orders to attack will be given in German but orders to retreat in another language."

In Western Germany, the men on the Left who oppose the European Army have as their allies those reactionary Junkers who toy with "national unity," even under Soviet auspices, and also some of the neo-Nazis. In France, the Gaullists are flanked in this campaign by equally reactionary heirs to the Petainist tradition but also by men of the Left—by factions of the Socialist Party, by non-Communist working-class neutralist groups and, even more ardently, by the intellectualist neutralists for whom Claude Bourdet's *Observateur* speaks. In Great Britain, the followers of Aneurin Bevan are not only in the same bed of malicious and malingering opposition with Lord Beaverbrook. They have also hidden allies in considerably high places within the Tory government itself.

But the negative attitude of the present British Government to the Schuman and Pleven Plans, as set forth at Strasbourg by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, certainly gives at least aid and comfort to the enemies of the European Army and Europeanism. In taking this attitude, Churchill was, of course, prompted by his conception of British national interest.

And there are many pro-Atlantic continental Europeans who hope that between the Washington talks and the Lisbon Conference, America will decide to face the problem of the European Army not moralistically, as a world preacher, but in terms of strict national interest.

Paris PERCY WINNER

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THE SWORD OF THE SPIRIT

by R. H. Tawney

THE FOLLOWING *plea for war aims was published in the London* Athenaeum *of December, 1917. We regard it as one of the finest statements of the liberal spirit ever published. We reprint it this Christmas because each phrase and thought and its entire spirit seem to us clearly relevant in today's struggle.*

Britain was at the height of her material and military power when this protest and appeal was written. Victory in war was only a matter of time. But, turning from these surface advances to the underlying deterioration of Britain's spirit, Tawney, the liberal historian, rightly discerned that a state of mind was hardening among the allies which would perpetuate the unending cycle of victory, disillusionment and future wars.

. . . The most obvious temper of war is a passion for effective action. But the very concentration of effort upon action disturbs a clear apprehension of the principles which give action its significance, and which alone make the wars of nations something either nobler or baser than the battles of wolves over carrion. The menace which men see is that their material forces should be weaker than those of their opponents. They organize, and sweat, and die, that they may avert it. By incredible exertions they hold the means of military victory in their hands. "At last," they say, "we are neither out-numbered, nor out-generaled, nor out-gunned. Victory is in sight." And victory eludes them; or, if it seems to be in sight, it is not the victory which they willed in the hour of vision which preceded the whirlwind of feverish activity. Too often it is not only not the same: it is the opposite.

The destruction, by the effort to achieve victory, of the moral principles which alone can justify a war, is the commonest lesson of history. It is the defeat which men prepare for themselves, as the danger of defeat by the enemy becomes more remote. The change in their temper is not understood by them; or none, except the very few and very base, would tolerate it. It comes disguised as patriotism, self-sacrifice, a more perfect and unquestioning devotion. . . . Men . . . cannot see the distant heights they saw before the struggle began; and because they cannot see them they believe that they no longer exist, and turn angrily on those who remind them that the foundations of the world are what they were. In their obliviousness of all that does not directly forward their success, they imperil the success for which they strive by forgetting in what it consists. The spirit of their cause works for them, and offers them the greatest demonstration of its power that the world has seen for a century. Like men who curse every wind that does not fill their own sails, they turn from it with a sneer of impatience, because it cannot be made of immediate military advantage; and since they will not let it work for them, it ends by working against them. As the original meaning of their effort grows faint, new interpretations of it are suggested, which add obliteration to forgetfulness. Like Bunyan in his anguish, they are surrounded by voices clamoring: "Sell it! Sell it! Sell it for security. Sell it for empire. Sell it for economic advantage. Sell it for revenge." But, unlike Bunyan, they do not know the fiend for what he is. And since, being human, they cannot live without a creed, the loyalty which was given to the cause for which the War was undertaken is transferred to the War itself. It becomes an article of faith, whose character and objects it is heresy to question. The inertia, the apathy, the weight of custom and routine, which made it difficult to begin, make it hardly less difficult to contemplate its being ended, and in proportion as the soldiers grow more pacific, the civilians grow more bellicose. Peace itself is no longer thought of as the reconciliation of enemies through the victory of a principle. It is the last trick to be snatched by the winner of a game of bluff and cunning. Humanity, tolerance, the generosity which would feel that the nation were contaminated if it snatched material advantages from the world's misery, the liberal spirit which knows that even among its enemies there is a better mind, and preserves through the conflict the hope of reconciliation, are denounced as treason to those who have fallen, though it was in the hope of some such glorious resurrection that they fell. In so far as it yields to that spirit, the world staggers blindly to hell along a path paved with the corpses of men who offered their lives for its salvation. . . .

Of all the dangers that confront a nation at war, this degeneration of national purpose, so common in the past as to seem part of human nature itself, is the greatest. It impedes its success, and would degrade it if it were attained. But, if they will, men can escape it. And the way to escape it is for them to keep their moral forces alive and active, by perpetually reflecting on the motives with which they went to war, and on the kind of peace which, not in the heat of the conflict, but in the calmer mood which preceded it, they desired to establish. It is

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to refuse to be frightened by national danger into national egotism, and to judge all proposals and policies, not by the immediate advantages which they may seem to offer to this nation or that, but by their compatibility with the original purpose, which may not have been the only motive, but was nevertheless the moral justification, for undertaking war. In order to secure itself against the solicitations which distract it from its main goal a nation ought periodically to redefine its object. Like believers in a world of scoffers, it ought solemnly to rehearse the articles of its faith.

Such a redefinition is the most urgent need of Great Britain at the present stage in the War. It is necessary, not because the national purpose has changed, but in order to convince the nation and its allies that it has not. The strength of the allied cause three years ago was that element of detachment from purely national ambitions, which seemed to some baser minds its weakness, and which, therefore, they have tried to expel. It was derived less from astute diplomacy than from its conformity with the deeper forces which, since the French Revolution, have been at work—with many cross-currents and backwashes, with many obstacles, which England as well as Germany has helped to erect—for national freedom, and for a growth of international solidarity based upon law. The qualities which made Great Britain slow to mobilize its military resources were also those which gave it some small place in the confidence, even in the affection, of other nations. Its faults were obvious and childlike: its naïf worship of material success, its contempt for reflection, its savage provincialism. But it appealed even to its critics because it seemed, if not to be disinterested—for what nation is disinterested?—at least to acknowledge the existence in political affairs of a higher law than national self-interest. . . .

. . . The strength of Germany has consisted in its power of concentration. The strength of the allies has consisted in their power of expansion and attraction. No doubt some such concentration of purpose and organization as Germany has practised for a generation is necessary in France and England in time of war. But it is even more important to cultivate the appeal to the better mind of mankind which comes from the disinterested advocacy of a principle. It speaks when the guns are silent. It fights with the armies. And when the armies are dead, it fights on.

Such was our strength; and after three years of war we should have learned both our strength and our weakness. But we have not learned them. Or, if we have, while we have supplemented our weakness, we have not cultivated our strength. Indeed, in some ways we have impaired it. We have impaired it, because we have allowed it to be overgrown by elements foreign to the original purpose of the nation, or even inconsistent with it. . . .

But, it will be said, the English Government cannot state "terms of peace." It cannot "act independently of its allies." Of course it cannot. Nor is it suggested that it should. What it can do is to state, after consultation with its allies, the provisional terms upon which the Entente is prepared to begin the discussion of settlement. It can distinguish between those items in the settlement which the allies are pledged to attain before they cease hostilities, and those items which they would desire to attain as the result of negotiations—between the injustices perpetrated in the course of the War, which Germany must consent to undo before discussion is possible, and the wider reorganization of Europe which would have been desirable even had no war occurred, and which war cannot achieve. . . . To refuse to state the terms upon which the allies would be willing to enter upon negotiations is to invite the suspicion that they do not state them because they do not dare to do so, because "they are out for what they can get," because they do not aim at military victory in order to obtain conditions which are just, but will estimate the justice of different claims by the extent of the military victory which they succeed in obtaining. . . .

"All this," it will be replied, "is irrelevant. Our duty is to achieve victory." Certainly it is our duty to achieve victory. It is because a more precise definition of our objects would contribute to victory that such a definition is indispensable. It is necessary, not in order that we may now make peace, but in order that we may more effectively make war, by waging it with our minds as well as with our bodies. If victory cannot be achieved by policy alone, neither can it be achieved, as men built the Pyramids, by the unreflecting expenditure of physical energy and the sacrifice of countless human lives. If policy without power is lame, power without policy is blind. Since when was it an axiom of statecraft that a nation should demand everything from the courage of its soldiers, and nothing from the wisdom of its statesmen? And in what, after all, does victory consist? Are we at the age of picture-books, stage-struck with the vision of a Roman "triumph," a procession of generals and ministers to the Capitol with captives bound to their chariots? What test of victory is there except the acceptance by the enemy of the terms which he is desired to accept? . . .

It may readily be conceded that there is not at present any evidence that the existing German Government would accept them. But that is a reason for stating provisional terms, not for declining to state them. . . . Either the allies would begin negotiations and end un-

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fathomable misery, or they would make it evident beyond controversy that those who fall in the future will fall to realize the objects which they approved when they took up arms.

It is not evident now. It is not evident to our allies, or to our peoples, or to our enemies, or to our armies. We fight in an obscurity which makes the resolution of our adversaries more desperate because more despairing, and which weakens our own by obliterating the moral principles on which it formerly was based. Our prayer might be that of Ajax: "Let us fall in the light." But it is addressed, not to the gods, but to the governments, which blind the nations with the fog which they create to conceal themselves. . . .

To define at once and in explicit terms the conditions precedent to the commencement of negotiations is, therefore, the path of wisdom. It is also the path to the only kind of victory which it is wholesome for England to win or for Germany to endure. There is a moral as well as a military strategy. Its aim is to undermine the central fortress of an opponent's resistance by appealing to principles which his government repudiates, but which his people may be willing to accept, because they are the foundation of popular liberty. Every nation whose cause is not purely egotistical has an ally in the heart of its enemy, whom it may alienate by menaces, or strengthen by the recognition of the common interests of common humanity. What our statesmen seem to have forgotten is that the Allies are not fighting Germany, as nations have fought in the past merely for territory or for commerce. They cannot, it is true, escape from the influence of these things. But it is not by them alone that the special quality of this war can be explained. They are fighting to resist the extension by force of a more than usually immoral political system, to which, if it had been successful, the world, with its reverence for demonstrable achievements and for the triumphant fact, would probably have tended to conform. . . .

"Therefore it is unnecessary," said the writer of a little book which made some stir in the world 400 years ago, "for a Prince to have all the good qualities which I have enumerated. But it is very necessary to appear to have them. . . . to appear merciful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed, that, should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite." "To change to the opposite," there it is! Who, in the agony of the past three years, has not felt within himself and his countrymen the beginning of that change? Who has not excused it by the thought of the peril of his nation and of the abominations of its enemies? And yet who, if he will expel from his mind the passion which war arouses, not in the actual combatants, but in its spectators, would not admit that the motive which justifies this war was not national interest, but a principle; that its object is the defeat, not merely of Prussia, but of the Prussian spirit—not merely national security, but a better order of international relations; and that it is only upon the basis of right that a better order of international relations can be built? Either a war is a crusade, or it is a crime; there is no halfway house. . . .

IS DISARMAMENT POSSIBLE?

by Captain Liddell Hart

THERE IS much talk of a "settlement" with Soviet Russia. What are the prospects? The word "settlement" tends to put expectations dangerously high. For nothing is so likely to create, or aggravate, a dangerous situation as the shock of sudden disillusionment.

Moreover, the people who most ardently expect and desire a peaceful settlement are the people most likely to suffer the worst reaction, even a bellicose reaction, when their hopes of a settlement are disappointed. Peace planning too often seems to breed a sense of self-righteousness that provokes war, or precipitates it, instead of preventing it.

The word "settlement" has an unreal sense of finality in it—and thus paves the way for disillusionment. A study of history does not encourage much belief in its possibility, however desirable it may be.

Politically, the settlements which governments make are liable to be upset by changes of government, changes of popular mood, changes of friendship, changes of economic condition, changes in the balance of power. The kind of settlement that takes the form of a signed-and-sealed treaty is often the most precarious—because its fixity makes it less adjustable to changing conditions.

Nor does history make one hopeful of the possibility of arriving at a "settlement" about disarmament. There have been repeated attempts to make progress toward peace by this path, but no successes. While the pursuit of security in armament races has always proved fatal, disarmament has offered no way out.

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The proposal for a general scaling down of armaments seems the easiest solution, and has the most obvious appeal—not least on economic grounds. But numerical scales form, in practice, the most difficult approach to the problem. Each country is naturally inclined to exaggerate its own special circumstances, and overestimate its own minimum needs—while failing to see the justification for what others claim. Thus a discussion of the relative size of national forces leads to interminable wrangling, and to no definite conclusion.

Any such quantitative approach to the problem seems especially impracticable now. For Soviet Russia has such a large existing superiority in *numbers*, of men and machines, that any all-round reduction of a proportionate kind would do nothing to improve the security of the Western countries, who are much weaker in armed numbers. It would entail the fixation of their present condition of inferiority. The effect would be dangerous psychologically as well as materially. A feeling of insecurity makes for war, whereas a feeling of security makes for peace.

A qualitative kind of disarmament, as proposed at Geneva in 1932, was a more promising approach. First, because the abolition of particular weapons had a better chance of being agreed to than any numerical scale. Second, because the general abolition of certain weapons at that time would have nullified the prospects of successful aggression. If tanks and bomber-aircraft had been universally abolished in 1932 as was then proposed, and nearly agreed, and a system of international inspection established as a check on their revival, there could have been no successful blitzkrieg in 1939-40.

For Hitler owed his initial victories mainly to those particular defense-breaking weapons. Numbers of troops counted for little in comparison. Indeed, his opponents had the superiority in that respect.

If the decisive weapons had once been banned, it would have been very difficult for Hitler to have developed them in secret to an adequate pitch of effectiveness—even without the check of an international inspectorate. For tanks and bombers largely depend for their effectiveness on their crews having operational practice in exercises, and such practice could hardly have been hidden.

But the value of any such agreement now on qualitative disarmament might be nullified because of the much greater chances of carrying out the necessary practice somewhere in the depths of Asiatic Russia. Evasion of any agreed system of inspection would be far easier than in Europe. There would also be much less chance of any fresh developments of a sinister kind being spotted and reported by travelers.

An awareness of what science is doing also discourages optimism about the basic solidity of any disarmament agreement, even if agreement could be reached. In earlier centuries, the pace of development was very slow and thus provided a reasonably firm basis for military calculations. Even so, there was abundant error, simply because official military minds were even slower to change their conceptions. But in this century the application of science to warfare has produced an ever-increasing acceleration of weapon development that is now threatening to nullify even the possibility of military calculation.

I was one of the early advocates of what is called "operational research"—the application of the scientific method of inquiry to the study of warfare. In trying to apply it myself I managed to be fairly successful in predicting, after World War I, the main military developments that governed World War II. Yet I feel very dubious now in attempting any predictions about a World War III, if war should break out. And I don't feel much confidence in even the best organized system of operational research. Things are moving so fast in the weapon sphere that even the most scientific calculation becomes little better than speculation.

The technical instability of any military basis of settlement, and plan for mutual disarmament thus becomes all too clear. It is worth taking some risks—short of fundamental risks—along these lines because of the psychological value. But it would be unwise to count on such steps too much, and wise to regard them as subsidiary.

The main hope of preserving peace lies on the higher level of "grand strategy." Whereas strategy is only concerned with winning a war, grand strategy takes a longer view. Even in war it never loses sight of the peace that will follow and should guide the war with that aim always in view. It is no less needed in peace—not only to preserve peace but to produce a better state of peace. It might be called the higher strategy of enlightened self-interest.

The conduct of grand strategy rests with statesmen—though soldiers ought to understand it, as servants of government. While it is primarily political, in the sense of policy, it requires on the part of the political leaders an understanding of war, and particularly of how wars come about.

In dealing with the present problem, it would be wiser for Western statesmen, and all of us, to become adjusted to a continuation of difficulties, and tense maneuvering, than to look for any definite settlement. Such settlements are uncommon in history, but situations change. That very changeability may, in course of time, solve our present problems *indirectly*. It has frequently done so in the past, even in the case of problems that seemed quite insoluble.

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The problem we face today is appallingly hard, the most difficult in history since the devastating wars of religion between the rival fanaticism of Catholicism and Protestantism three centuries back. Yet that seemingly insoluble problem gradually faded away. Then from 1815 to 1905, a stretch of 90 years, Britain and the British in India lived almost continually under the cloud of war with Tsarist Russia. Yet by an amazingly rapid change we came to find ourselves in alliance with the Russians, against the Germans—our traditional allies!

My vocation has been the study of war—the exploration of its causes, conditions, course and effects. In studying the way that wars break out I came to see that the best hope of its prevention lies in a well-judged avoidance of the things that always tend to produce a catastrophe. In a sense this is a negative solution—but it is a negative that proves the way for the positive. It keeps clear of the accident-causes that are apt to be fatal, and keeps the road open for eventual progress toward a better situation.

Statesmen need to realize the psychological effect of getting an opponent in a corner. Many people have now come to think that Soviet Russia cannot be placated, and there is a growing belief that no conciliatory move will allay her rulers' desire to grab more gains wherever they can. If that belief is correct it becomes all the more vital that in our precautionary counter-measures we should bear in mind the long-standing lesson of police experience that "a burglar doesn't commit murder unless he is cornered." That applies in the community of nations as in any smaller community.

The study of war has taught me that almost every war was avoidable, and that the outbreak was most often produced by statesmen losing their heads, or their patience, and putting their opponent in a position where he could not draw back without serious loss of "face." Clumsy efforts to forestall a feared aggression have too often provoked it—particularly where politically-inspired moves have jumped beyond strategic possibilities.

There have been too many recent examples. Chamberlain's "guarantees" to Poland, in 1939, a sudden reversal of his policy of appeasement had the obvious effect of combining provocation with temptation. No dictator could be expected to submit to such a slap in the face. At the same time, the palpable impossibility of Britain giving any effective help to a country so remote as Poland tempted Hitler to show the futility of the guarantee. Yet the captured German archives show that Hitler had not intended to deal with Poland in 1939, and that he only made up his mind to attack her after Chamberlain had made his unfulfillable offer of support. So the guarantee merely guaranteed that war would start at the time most disadvantageous for the Western powers.

Similarly, MacArthur's advance beyond the 38th Parallel last autumn was the surest way of provoking the Chinese to intervene in the Korean conflict—after three months' hesitation on their part. It is a sad reflection on Western statesmen that they were carried away by the flush of success in regaining South Korea, and made no adequate effort to put a brake on the continuation of the advance.

The statesmen of the Western democracies should have learned two fundamental lessons from their bitter and repeated experience since 1939. Don't try to bluff on an obviously weak hand. Do try to look at each step you plan from the other side's viewpoint—*before* you take the step.

To minimize provocation in building up our power of defense, we need to get into "the other man's mind." We must try to understand Communist-Russian mentality —not only its Marxist logic, missionary fervor, and urge for expansion of power, but its underlying fears, intense suspiciousness, and strange ignorance: all accentuated by prolonged isolation and the nature of its system. It would help us to understand, for example, what the Russians may feel about American military activities in Iran, close to their vital sources of oil supply in the Caucasus, or about efforts to make Sweden join the Atlantic Alliance.

It is evident that Soviet Russia does not want to venture on war, for if she did she would have struck before the West began to rearm, when the going would have been easy. The biggest risk now is that the Western powers may say or do things likely to make the Russian Government feel that the Western powers will take the offensive once their rearmament is completed. If the Russian Government becomes definitely convinced that such a stroke is certain to come, they will not be likely to wait for it.

From that point of view there is obviously more threat in multiplying the scale of America's long-range strategic air force than in NATO's effort to build up a ground force and tactical air force for the defense of Western Europe. The planned scale of this NATO force is such that it may suffice to check a Russian invasion of the West, but is not nearly enough for an invasion of Russia. It is thus plainly defensive, not offensive, in purpose—a shield rather than a sword.

An adequate covering force on the ground is a better safeguard than to depend purely on the retaliatory threat of atom bombing. An atom bomber is a bad policeman or frontier-guard. It is uncertain of stopping an invader, while likely to be mutually fatal in ultimate effects.

But the best safeguard of all is for all of us to keep cool. Indignation and exasperation are primary risks, for such emotions are all too likely to produce a fatal

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explosion. Nothing can be more fatal than the feeling, "it's bound to come—let's get it over." War is not a way *out* from danger and strain. It's a way *down* into a pit of unknown depth.

On the other hand, tension so intense as now is almost bound to relax eventually if war is postponed long enough. This has happened often before in history, for situations change. They never remain static. But it is always dangerous to be too dynamic, and impatient, in trying to force the pace. A war-charged situation can only change in two ways. It is bound to become better, eventually, if war is avoided without surrender.

CAN WE LIVE IN PEACE?

by Arnold Toynbee

CAN OUR Western world and the Communist world live at peace with each other side by side? Is their peaceful co-existence something desirable from our Western point of view? And, if we come to the conclusion that it is desirable, as well as possible, for these two worlds to put up with one another's presence on the face of the same planet, on what terms can we look forward to seeing them live and let live?

I suppose, among all current questions, these three are about the most highly controversial ones that anybody could pick out for discussion. What is *possible* is controversial; what is *desirable* is controversial. The most that any of us can do is to say what he personally expects and personally hopes.

I suppose one of the few points on which all of us in the West are in agreement with each other today is just this point that we must be firm, that we must rearm, that we must be vigilantly on our guard. But it does not follow from any of this that we must resign ourselves to the prospect of a Third World War as being something inevitable. As I see it, it is just as important for us now to keep on reminding ourselves that a Third World War is really not inevitable, as it is important for us now to be firm and energetic and on the watch.

In saying this, I have another historical precedent in mind. I am thinking of the history of Anglo-Russian relations during the years 1856-1885. In the Crimean War the Western powers had foiled an attempt of Russia's to put Turkey in her pocket. They had inflicted on Russia a humiliating defeat which the Russians naturally wanted to reverse, as the Germans, after 1918, wanted to reverse *their* defeat after the First World War. So, like Germany in the 1930s, Russia in the 1860s began to expand eastward overland, in a quarter where the British Navy could not operate; and this expansion of Russia's in Asia in the nineteenth century, like her present expansion, was taken very hard in the liberal Western world. At least twice within the 30 years ending in 1885, Great Britain found herself on the verge of going to war with Russia again. The first occasion was in 1878, when Russia had fought another war with Turkey and had beaten Turkey to its knees. The second occasion was in 1885, when the Russian advance in Central Asia reached the Northwestern frontiers of Afghanistan. At those two dates, at least, another Anglo-Russian war seemed inevitable. And then, after all, it did not happen this time.

After reaching a final peak of intensity in 1885, the long drawn-out nineteenth-century tension between Britain and Russia began to relax. Within 22 years the two powers had entered into an entente with each other in face of a new menace to both of them from Germany. And between 1907 and now they have twice been allies in a world war, first in 1914-1917 and then for a second time in 1941-1945.

My point in bringing up these episodes of past history is this. It is possible that our present tension with Russia may end in another war, as our tension with Germany after the First World War ended in a Second World War. It is also possible that our present tension with Russia may end in a relaxation of the tension, as our tension with Russia after the Crimean War eventually relaxed without ending in another war between the two powers.

At the present moment, no doubt, it is impossible for us to foresee in which of these two possible alternative ways the present tension between the Western world and Russia is going to end. We must be prepared for the less happy as well as for the more happy possibility; but we must surely be prepared for both possibilities. In facing the possibility of another 1939, we must not lose sight of the possibility of another 1885.

But is it possible for a democratic free Western world and a Communist totalitarian Russia to live and let live on the face of a planet that has now become physically "one world" as a result of "the annihilation of distance" by newfangled methods of mechanical transport? Well, yes, this *is* possible, as I see it. I see this possibility in

This article by the British historian Arnold Toynbee is taken from a broadcast over the BBC.

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the light of another historical precedent. I am thinking of the one world, stretching from Britain to India, which was called into existence by the expansion of the ancient Greek civilization in and after the time of Alexander the Great.

For about seven centuries, running from the last century B.C. to the seventh century of the Christian Era, that ancient world was partitioned between a Western and an Eastern power: the Roman Empire in the West and a rival Oriental Empire in Persia. It is true that Rome and her Iranian rivals did go to war with one another from time to time; but to the point is that each of them soon discovered that it was beyond its strength to conquer, subjugate and annex the other. Each of them did make the attempt, only to find that it must give it up because the effort was straining its own resources to breaking point. So those two ancient powers resigned themselves to the necessity of their co-existing, and they did go on living in one world side by side for very nearly 700 years. When they fell into a life-and-death struggle with one another at last, they had to pay for this mistake, cash down, by both immediately succumbing to a common new enemy: the Saracens. Why should it not be possible, in our modern one world, for the West and the Union of Soviet Russia to repeat that episode of ancient history?

Granting for the moment that this may be *possible*, do we *want* to see it happen? As I see it, the peaceful co-existence of our Western civilization and a Russian Communist society is not merely possible: it is also highly desirable for two good reasons, one negative and one positive.

My negative reason is my belief that a third world war fought with atomic weapons would plunge our planet into a chaos which would be beyond even America's power to bring into order again. I am assuming that America would win a third world war hands down; and I will also make the further assumption that the United States would come out of such a war without grave damage to herself (though I find few Americans so optimistic as that about their country's prospects of coming through unscathed). But I take it for granted that, at the end of a third world war in which Russia had been knocked out by America, the whole of the Old World would have been laid flat—not only Russia, but Europe, Asia and Africa as well. And would even an undamaged US have the strength, by herself, to set the whole of the rest of the world on its feet again?

My positive reason for thinking a third world war undesirable is that, even if that fearful worldwide destruction could eventually be repaired by a victorious United States, it would not, as I see it, be healthy for the world, or healthy for America herself, for there only to be one sole surviving power in the world. In order to keep morally fit, human nature needs to be exercised and kept in training by some devil or other; and our Western world today is having this indispensable, though very disagreeable, service performed for her by Russia. The other way around, too, if we can submit with a good grace to the practical joke of seeing ourselves for a moment as Russian eyes see us, I fancy that the capitalist world, dressed up in horns, hooves, forked tail and the Devil's other stage properties, is a bogey that Communist Russia needs just as much as a democratic West needs the bogey of Russian totalitarianism to keep her up to the mark. In fact, neither of these two incongruous neighbors would find it easy to keep in good health if the other were entirely eliminated.

What kind of *modus vivendi* can we imagine? I cannot imagine any formal agreement between us to behave to each other as good neighbors; but I can imagine an unspoken determination on either side not to fall into a shooting war with the other party. The kind of peaceful co-existence that consists merely in the avoidance of a shooting war between the principal parties may well prove to be a state of extremely painful stress, anxiety and discomfort.

There might be other *local* shooting wars like the war in Korea. And I personally feel sure that, even if we manage to avoid dropping atom bombs on each other, we shall continue to wage our present missionary war—I mean, the competitive propaganda of our rival ideas and ideals. This, I fancy, will go on until Asia becomes formidable enough to the rest of us to make the English-speaking peoples begin to look upon Russia as "the white man's hope"; and, even if that eventually happens, we shall then merely be exchanging a Russian peril for an Asian one, as we have exchanged a Russian peril for a German one, and then a German peril for a Russian one, within living memory. You will see that I am not doing you the disservice of prophesying to you smooth things. I am prophesying a continuance of toil and trouble for as long as we can peer ahead into our future; and, as I see it, this prophecy is a safe one to make; for I personally agree with Eliphaz the Termanite's view that "man is born unto trouble, as the sparks fly upward." Indeed I will go farther than Eliphaz goes in the Book of Job. I will put it to you that, if ever man does manage to elude trouble, he merely brings trouble on himself, because trouble, after all, is the necessary salt of life without which life loses its savor. So perhaps the unwritten condition on which we and the Russians are going to co-exist is that each party shall go on serving as the other party's devil.

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THE GREATEST ADVENTURE IN DEMOCRACY

by Krishnalal Shridharani

BEFORE America adds up her election troubles in 1952 she might glance at India, where the first national election is under way. The problems, and the stakes, make the election perhaps the most colossal experiment in the history of democracy.

If India surmounts its problems and conducts fair and free elections, it will offer a proof to the world that democracy is valid among all peoples at all times. If, on the other hand, votes are bought and sold like cattle, India will cause a setback to the democratic idea.

Ninety-five percent of the electorate in India is illiterate. The number of those who own radio sets is even less than five percent. The countryside is still not electrified and there are no good roads which would make communication and transportation easy. In fact, during the rainy season it is difficult to travel from one village to another. Freedom is only four years old, and the vast majority of the people have no experience in democratic processes. The little experience that India has in the complicated art of electioneering is based upon a very limited franchise qualified by education and property ownership.

Yet the total number of enrolled voters is in the neighborhood of 175 million. All that a voter has to be is to be a citizen of India and to be over 21.

These 175 million voters will be called upon in January/February, 1952, to choose 3,772 representatives by direct election, and 546 representatives by indirect elections. The House of the People, which resembles the British House of Commons, has 489 seats. The Council of State, which is analogous to the British House of Lords, will have 200 members chosen indirectly through electoral colleges. The various State Legislative Assemblies will have 3,283 members. Seven States will have Upper Houses also, to be known as Legislative Councils. Over and above these, there will be representatives nominated by the President, 73 to the State Legislative Councils, 16 to the Council of State and eight to the House of the People. An electoral college of all members of the Central Parliament and of State Legislative Assemblies will choose the President of the "Sovereign Democratic Republic" of India.

To return these many representatives from a greater number of aspirants, 2,299,478 ballot boxes will be required. The number of ballot papers, all 3.35" x 2" in size, is more staggering—620 million. It is estimated that all of the presses in the state of Madras will have to be busy for six months to print the required number of ballots.

India is divided into three types of states. Nine Part "A" States, with governors at their heads, have had some limited election experience. Some of the seven Part "B" States, with Rajpramukhs at their heads, have never had any elections, while all the 10 Part "C" States have never seen anything like a ballot box. Kashmir constitutes the fourth category, because its future status in the Union of India is still in the crucible.

The timing for the polling is a special headache. The authorities have to take into account great weather contrasts, such as the Himalayan snow in the North, and Equatorial heat in Cape Comzorin. Different parts have diverse harvesting seasons, and it is not easy for farmers to leave their fields for the polling booths when they are engaged in sowing or reaping. Even famine conditions have to be taken into consideration before settling the date for elections. Add to this the paucity of trained official observers. In many states, elections will have to be held from place to place in rotation so that the same officials can reach vast distances.

Polling day will be declared as a holiday. Each voter will have to vote twice, for the State Legislature and for the Parliament. In many cases, each voter will have to cast his ballot in favor of three to five representatives from a larger number of candidates.

There are 2,438 single-member constituencies, while there are 666 multi-member constituencies. The government is to employ 600,000 people specially for the polling. It is estimated that $21 million will be spent on them alone. Add to this an equal amount of overhead spent on an equal number of regular employees of the government who would be doing election work in one form or another. Political parties and individual candidates will spend around an additional $84 million. So, representative form of government will cost poor India well over $126 million.

An aspirant for the Parliament is allowed by law to spend $5,250 for his campaign in a single-member constituency, while the ceiling would be raised up to $7,350 in case he is to contest a seat in a double-member constituency. An individual candidate in a three-member constituency in West Bengal is allowed to spend up to

(*Continued on page 23*)

Krishnalal Shridharani, the New Republic correspondent in New Delhi, is himself an independent candidate from the state of Saurashtra for the House of the People in the coming election.

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HAROLD L. ICKES: *Surgeon's Knife or Soothing Syrup*

I GREATLY ADMIRED the lawyerlike job that was done in the Alger Hiss case by Thomas F. Murphy. I have been told by a man in a position to know that his record as an Assistant US District Attorney in New York was an excellent one. Following his signal success in the Hiss case, Mr. Murphy was made Police Commissioner, for whatever reason the erratic and undependable Mayor Vincent Impellitteri of New York had for naming him. His tenure of that office was too brief to create more than the initial impression that he started off well. It may be that the political crooks surrounding Mayor Impellitteri, knowing the intimate ties between New York City politics and organized vice and crime, preferred to take their chances with Murphy, a single US District Judge with limited jurisdiction, than with Murphy, Police Commissioner, with almost devastating powers to use against gangsterism if he wished to use them. Without any implication and while more than well disposed to give Murphy the benefit of any doubt, this "promotion" from a sphere of strictly limited power to one that was almost unlimited could have been brought about by those sincerely interested in the public welfare. Or, equally, for purposes of their own, it could have been brought about by those who have preyed, and always will prey, upon good government and organized society.

No one interested in the good of his country can have failed to be disturbed by the uncovering in recent weeks of ugly sores on the body politic. These have been festering unsuspected while being absprbed, hour by hour, day by day, and week by week, into the blood stream of the republic. This pus had broken out into a repellent rash of five and ten-percenters, favors to tax evaders, influence peddlers, tax fixers, accepters of bribes, luxurious joy-ridings and parties in which law-enforcement officers have been guests and law-violators hosts. Wrongdoing has been condoned and covered up and by high executive officials. Pushover executives have yielded to street-walking members of Congress who would do anything for a "constituent." In short, the once-comely countenance of America has become ugly to look at.

Obviously, something had to be done by President Truman. So he cut his vacation at Key West short and flew back to Washington on December 9. A real blast of moral indignation against those who, in betraying their country, were betraying him would have caused a feeling of happiness and confidence to express itself in a spontaneous shout of joy. Although this was not forthcoming, the people waited patiently and confidently.

Would the President appoint, as a temporary godfather of his country with an amplitude of powers, a Charles Evans Hughes, or a bipartisan team consisting of a Senator Pomerene and a Supreme Court Justice Roberts? Or would he call the name of a man who deservedly, but perhaps only temporarily, stood in generally high regard with the American people? To do the first would be really to cast the die for political decency. To do the second might be only to take a carefully calculated risk with a belief that a completely untried man in a new field would not really be able to put the public welfare above all personal and political considerations. Although the "carefully calculated risk" may blow up in the face of the administration, unfortunately, the President has chosen that course.

The job that Judge Murphy has undertaken is more than a prosecutor's job. It is a job for a keen, penetrating and mature mind, determined upon, and capable of, carrying out a probing into the shambles for which traitors and thieves have been responsible. Such a man must neither possess a friend nor fear an enemy. Relentlessly, he must follow every trail, regardless of whither it may lead. He must be able to resist the terrific pressures that will be brought to bear upon him by forces whose range and variety he probably now does not even suspect. For the sake of the country, it is to be hoped that Judge Murphy, even if only fortuitously, may be the man of all men for the task that has been thrust into his hand. However, the fact must be realized that he has never, before this, had placed upon him such a moral responsibility as is his today. To pursue a perjurer as a government prosecutor does not compare with the carrying out of an assignment where official and private pressures are not against the man under general suspicion, as in the Hiss case, but are for "saving the party" by protecting from detection, or from just punishment, those who had no concern whether or not their knaveries and thieveries might result in destroying the party.

The situation would be more reassuring if, during the necessarily secret conferrings preceding Judge Murphy's selection, sober-minded observers did not suspect that they detected the muted voices of one or two Cabinet officers, a certain member of the White House staff, as well as that of an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court who is desperately interested in keeping his name from the crime-and-graft investigation. HAROLD L. ICKES

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

THE HISTORICAL WARNING OF THE HOTEL WORMLEY

by George Dangerfield

REUNION AND REACTION, by C. Vann Woodward (Little, Brown; $4).

THE "COMPROMISE" of 1876-77, which gave the Presidency to Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio, in open defiance of the election returns, is a puzzle that has resisted solution for more than seventy years. Was it a compromise or a conspiracy? The puzzle might have been solved at the very beginning: as an editorial in the Cincinnati *Enquirer* showed, the main features were known in 1877, and all that was required was to assemble the supporting facts, which were certainly near the surface in that year. But in 1877 the moral energies of America were exhausted—by the trauma of the Civil War, by an unparelleled, a corrupting industrial expansion, by the panic and depression of 1873, by the scandals of Grant's second term. Reform was in the air, but it was reform in the spirit of the undertaker—reform which prefers not to dissect disagreeable political facts but to bury them without an autopsy.

Historians of the period have always suspected that the "Compromise" of 1876-77 concealed a good deal more than it revealed. It had the same fascination for them that the tumulus has for the archeologist; but though they dug away at it, their findings were slim. As C. Vann Woodward puts it in his *Reunion and Reaction*, which tells the whole story for the first time, the problem might never have yielded to a direct attack. Many of his clues were unearthed in the course of a wider investigation and, as it were, by chance. Although he writes in a mood of restrained irony and carefully avoids sensationalism, the facts, after he has fitted them together, have the agonized appearance of something that was buried alive.

It is well known that the Presidential election of 1876 resulted in a victory for the Democratic candidate, Samuel J. Tilden of New York. None the less, on November 8, 1876, before the election returns were all in, the managers of the Republican candidate blandly announced that "Hayes has 185 electoral votes and is elected." In brief, they claimed the 19 electoral votes of South Carolina, Louisiana and Florida; and in order to substantiate this claim they instructed the returning boards of the three states to "canvass" the election returns so as to ensure a safe majority for Hayes in each state. The returning boards, being controlled by Republicans, hastened to obey the instructions of Hayes's managers, invalidating Democratic votes by the thousand. "The consensus of recent historical scholarship," Woodward writes, "is that Hayes was probably entitled to the electoral votes of South Carolina and Louisiana, that Tilden was entitled to the four votes of Florida, and that Tilden was therefore elected by a vote of 188 to 181. There has been no tendency to defend the members of the electoral boards or the methods used to influence them."

An Electoral Commission, created by Congress in the belief that it would be impartial, subsequently upheld all three of the Republican returning boards; but it made this decision in so flagrantly partisan a manner as to deceive no candid mind. The Democrats, who controlled the House of Representatives, therefore, though legally bound to accept the commission's verdict, decided to circumvent it by filibustering against the completion of the electoral count. As March 4, 1877, drew nearer it seemed probable that there would be no successor to President Grant; and that his eventual successor, whether Hayes or Tilden, would have to be imposed upon the country by force.

This dangerous crisis (so the traditional or pre-Woodward version has it) was averted by a last-minute conference between Republicans and Southern Democrats, held at the Wormley Hotel in Washington. The conferees agreed that if Hayes would promise to withdraw military support from the two remaining carpetbagger governments, the Southern Democrats would break their own party's filibuster and make him President. On March 2, the filibuster was broken and the electoral count completed in favor of Hayes. The Wormley bargain would have been an immoral one: but since it was made (so the traditional version insists) solely in the interests of peace, sectional amity and orderly government, it was to that extent a compromise—the solution of a grave crisis by a sad but necessary sacrifice of principle to expediency. As *Reunion and Reaction* proves, however, all the arrangements between the Hayes Republicans and the Southern Democrats had been made before the Wormley Conference took place.

The story of these arrangements, as Woodward tells it, should fascinate any reader who is not totally impervious to the recorded past. To be sure, it is only the last scene in the last act of a great drama; and it presupposes a rather more intimate knowledge of this drama than we are apt to possess. The drama is, of course, the one that Charles Beard has called the Second American Revolution—that is to say, the Civil War followed by the Reconstruction.

Revolutionary upheavals usually show a marked disparity between their ideals and their pragmatic objectives, and usually end by sacrificing the former to the latter The Second American Revolution was no exception. Its ideals are still visible in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The pragmatic objectives thronged the statute books of the seventies in the shape of a staggering congregation of high-tariff laws, "sound"-currency laws, and special statutory privileges for railroads,

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banks and corporations. The sacrifice of ideals to objectives was finally completed by the "election" of Hayes, which brought the Reconstruction to its end.

Hayes was a right-wing Republican who publicly supported the Reconstruction, but privately deplored it. With only two Republican state governments left in the South, the Reconstruction was manifestly tottering to its fall; and the time had come to abandon Republican Radicalism, which supported the propertyless freedman, and to make a deal with the South's political elite. It was because they believed that they could make such a deal that Hayes's managers asserted that "Hayes has 185 electoral votes and is elected." The leaders of Southern Democracy in 1876 were mostly old-time Whigs—men who had been sympathetic to Northern business enterprise before the Civil War, who had opposed secession and had joined the Democratic Party chiefly in the interest of White Supremacy. They were respectable men, and would not consent to betray Tilden without an immense compensation. After much dickering among the railroad interests involved, the Republicans came up with an offer of an $80 million loan to the Texas and Pacific Railroad, then languishing for lack of funds. The Texas and Pacific was controlled by Tom Scott's Pennsylvania Railroad and was only a branch of Northern enterprise. But the whole South believed in it—a line to the Pacific had been a Southern dream in ante-bellum days—forgetting the evils which subsidized railroads had already inflicted upon the Western farmer.

The railroad lobby *alone* could not have persuaded the Southern Democrats to betray their own candidate; and Hayes himself, having some reputation in Ohio as a railroad reformer, did not much care for the Texas and Pacific deal, though he allowed it to go on. He put his faith in what he called a more "purely political" approach. He let it be known that he was willing to jettison what was left of the Reconstruction. He said that he was in favor of generous federal expenditures in the South. And, as the pressure increased, he agreed to give a Southern Democrat a place in his cabinet: the portfolio of the Postmaster General, no less, was the price demanded and accepted. In return he expected, not only the Presidency, but also Southern Democratic assistance in organizing the new House of Representatives behind a Republican Speaker. Thus the Presidency was bought before the Wormley Conference ever took place; and the Southern Democrats would have broken their own filibuster if there had been no Wormley Conference at all. (Since there is little honor among thieves, the only specific parts of the bargain to be kept were those dealing with the Presidency and the Postmaster-Generalship. The Texas and Pacific loan did not materialize. The Southern Democrats refused to help elect a Republican Speaker.) This is the sordid and melancholy story which *Reunion and Reaction* has to tell.

In a wider sense, the "election" of Hayes meant that the leaders of Southern Democracy had decided to throw in their lot with Northern capitalism rather than with Eastern labor or Western agrarianism. This more lasting result could not have been too displeasing to Northern Democrats; and it is a fact that Samuel J. Tilden, a successful corporation lawyer, though he knew that he had been defrauded, accepted the fraud with a very good grace. In 1876 the two great parties were ceasing to be parties at all, in the sense that they reflected class differences or represented contests of principle, but were rapidly turning into interchangeable organizations, neither one of which was disposed to interfere with the prevailing submission of politics to big business. The stupefying dullness of American political history for the next twenty years is due to this submission on the one hand; and, on the other, to the rigidity of a party system which isolated progressive opinion within the respective parties, and thus effectively neutralized it. We have to some extent inherited this party system; and the light which *Reunion and Reaction* throws upon it, though incidental to the main theme, is harsh and instructive.

The main theme, of course, is that a progressive movement—and the Reconstruction, with all its faults, *was* progressive—was finally done to death by a coalition of conservative Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. The analogy between this coalition and contemporary Republican-Southern Democratic arrangements is too obvious to be labored; but it is by presenting us with such analogies—"obvious" only after they have been patiently unearthed and skillfully elucidated—that history lives, teaches and warns. And *Reunion and Reaction*, a most original and important book, indeed an explosive release of historical energy, utters a warning fully as resonant as its analogies are obvious: Our political institutions (not to mention our party system) might with difficulty survive such another Republican-Southern Democratic "compromise" as the one that brought Hayes to the White House in 1877.

George Dangerfield is the author, among other books, of The Strange Death of Liberal England. The Era of Good Feelings, *an account of the administrations of James Monroe and John Quincy Adams, will be published in January.*

OUR CRIME AGAINST SPAIN

THE FACE OF SPAIN, by Gerald Brenan (Pellegrini & Cudahy; $3.75).

THIS UNPRETENTIOUS BOOK about the life of Spaniards under Franco has the eloquence of understatement. Gerald Brenan travels through the southern half of Spain and writes his impressions. In the Civil War, he was a calm friend of the Republic; now he wishes to avoid politics; nevertheless—since the men and women he meets speak of practically nothing but hunger and the regime's stupidity and corruption—his report, almost despite itself, becomes a political pamphlet. Like other countries, Spain has always known poverty; but never in her tragic history has naked want been so widespread and so deep. The Civil War killed a million Spaniards, destroyed countless works of art that should have been immortal. But what is happening now is more dangerous. Franco's power from the beginning has come from foreign sources: first Fascist and Nazi, then Roman, American and British. Spain is, virtually, an *occupied* country; and the people who threw out Napoleon are fighting a losing war

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against the hunger, hopelessness and hate corroding their spirits and bodies.

The author records *a* face of Spain. He has no contact with the industrial workers; he meets his peasants on the road and his bourgeois in the cafés: in fact, his encounters seldom exceed those of an intelligent tourist. But he is artist enough to convey the whole from casual experience. One feels that he is honest, and that he is right. Yet understatement can go too far or become false. For example, Brenan remarks that "Everyone [in Madrid] either has money or is pretending to have it." Surely, he knows the huge poor sections of Madrid whose misery, when Galdós described it at the turn of the century, was purgatorial and today must be infernal.

But Brenan's worst sin is his use of the word *Red*. Again and again he speaks of the Civil War as between the Rights and the Reds. He must know that for the English and American reader today, Red means Communist; and he must know that when the military counter-revolution started, the great population which defended the Republic was liberal-democratic, Basque Catholic, Socialist (of various shades), Syndicalist and Anarcho-Syndicalist—with a mere Communist fraction that I have heard estimated, at the war's outbreak, at about 35,000 for the entire country. Brenan must know that this Communist group was small because its ideology and its politics were incompatible with the genius of the Spanish people. He must know what happened. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany armed the rebellion; when the unarmed people held it off with their bare breasts and cried for guns, France and the United States refused, and Britain blockaded the southern waters, warded off the loyal Spanish fleet and allowed Franco with his mercenary Moors to cross safely to the mainland. With the noble exception of Mexico, Russia alone helped the republicans. And, as General Miaja told me at the time: "Russia made Spain pay twice for every gun; once in gold, once in political power." This was the genesis of the growth of the Communists in Spain. After *we* had forced it, the hypocrites were ready with the lie that the invasion was a crusade against Communism. It is too bad that Brenan's looseness of phrase should play into the hands of the McCarrans and McCarthys.

The Republic made tragic mistakes: (1) it delayed the parceling of the land among the peasants; (2) with the usual obtuseness of rationalist liberals, it slighted the religious emotion of the people; (3) it trusted the allegiance oath of the army officers instead of throwing them out; (4) in the true way of Spanish individualism, having "constitutionally abolished war," it avoided alliance with any foreign power. But through the unbelievably outmoded complex of Spain's economy, President Azaña's government was slowly moving toward a social democracy that incorporated the cardinal values of Spain: values of *the person* and of freedom which the word Red hardly conveys.

The betrayal of Spain by the leaders of the West (Britain, France and the United States) symbolized the doom of Western civilization. As this book reveals, Spain herself becomes pale with anemia. But the spiritual vitality of the people has already created in America Hispana the fertile ground for a new world in which the Hispanic genius may be reborn. The crime against Spain points more directly to the fate of the culture that permitted it. We found it "expedient" to let the Fascists and Nazis (by way of rehearsal) murder Spain's republic. Now we find it "expedient" to link arms with Franco, that shrewd little manipulator of the sins of others. Such expediency, of course, as medicine is potassium cyanide. I wish the sincere brass of the Pentagon and the truly devout in the Church of Rome, who aim to "defend civilization" by swallowing poison, could see in the despair of the noble Spanish people the prophecy of their own doom. WALDO FRANK

WESTERN APPROACHES

THE CRUEL SEA, by Nicholas Monsarrat (Knopf; $4).

20TH MERIDIAN, by Robert Travers (Norton; $3).

THE ENEMY, by Wirt Williams (Houghton Mifflin; $3).

NICHOLAS MONSARRAT'S novel is not really a "sea story" at all. Despite its rather ingenuous title and the presence of expected storms, lusts and deaths, *The Cruel Sea* is a fine portrait of the individual struggles involved in modern naval war as well as an authoritative factual treatment of the nature of naval war itself.

Monsarrat, a veteran of the Battle of the Atlantic, has constructed his book on a broad, sweeping scale without losing any of the characterization and motivation so necessary if a novel is to be anything more than a dressed-up historical document. While he is unusually successful in capturing the perverse blend of despair and confidence which characterized the crucial war period for Britain, his cast is never a mere collection of vehicles for the hindsight of historical narrative. His people are separate and completely convincing human beings.

There is a rather extended anti-climax in the last few chapters when the setting shifts to larger ships with a resulting increase in impersonality, yet even this rings true. For the early failures of the war were more personal than the later successes; the very growth of efficiency and technique destroyed something of the sharing that was present in the worst of U-boat horror.

A serious reservation, however, must be made in regard to Monsarrat's harsh criticism of the "national spirit" of various peoples. The Irish come in for the bitterest sort of abuse for their neutrality, and there is a thinly veiled implication that the French are "naturally" defeatist and decadent. The author's equally positive assertions of English "natural" superiority on the sea do nothing to inspire confidence in the validity of his judgment.

The greatest merit of *The Cruel Sea* is Monsarrat's unification of externals and internals; the passages dealing with battle and storm have enormous impact, but the individuals who are both subject and cause of so much pain make themselves felt as known and sentient personalities.

Nothing brings home the importance of such characterization so much as the absence of it. *20th Meridian*, which deals with the wartime merchant marine, falls immediate victim to an all-pervading deficiency in this respect, and never recovers. Robert Travers attempts to sketch personalities by way of brief, unassimilated flashbacks which disrupt rather than supplement the flow of narrative. His language alternates between forced metaphor and self-conscious primitivism, and there is a deadly aura of familiarity surrounding each of his characters. Aside from a few adequate chapters about a storm, *20th Meridian* is a melodramatic and often superficial novel.

The Enemy is a book in which fiction is employed primarily as a setting for a plethora of technical military detail. Like Monsarrat, Wirt Williams is well ac-

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quainted with destroyer-submarine warfare in the North Atlantic, having served in that theatre during World War II. Many of his readers, however, may find themselves wishing he were not so preoccupied with his own knowledge. The young naval officer who narrates *The Enemy* not only uses a stream of obsure naval terminology but takes great care to explain it. This produces a pattern of statement and translation that is disastrous to the story.

Toward the end of his novel, the author attempts to set up a symbolism of evil, with the nameless and unseen submarine playing the White Whale. However, he is not content to imply his symbolism, but blurts out regular "explanations." Williams would have produced a better book if he had chosen to deal wholly with non-fiction. With a few scattered exceptions of an informative nature, *The Enemy* retains a surface treatment of a stirring theme. STANLEY COOPERMAN

Stanley Cooperman is a feature writer and reporter for Trans-Radio Press in New York City.

MUSIC

The Philharmonic

THE Philharmonic-Symphony Society of New York presented its 5,000th concert on December 13. On behalf of the City of New York, Mayor Vincent R. Impellitteri presented to Floyd G. Blair, president of the orchestra's board, a suitable plaque. George Szell, who served as guest conductor while Dimitri Mitropoulos was in the Middle West, revived the long-forgotten *New Overture in D* by Johann Wenzeslaus Kalliwoda, a prolific minor Bohemian composer of the period, which was played in the Society's first concert on December 7, 1842. (Szell is reported to have said that he would play the silly thing but would not repeat it at the next day's matinee when the program normally would be the same.)

On the day before the anniversary, the fund-raising group known as the Friends of the Philharmonic-Symphony announced that its public campaign—the orchestra's first in 17 years—had brought in more than $240,000, which will be used to wipe out the 1950-51 deficit and establish a reserve. This fund, which may be swelled before the closing date of December 31, together with the increased revenue from tickets that are no longer subject to a 20-percent tax, will enable the Society to operate for at least a couple of years.

The Philharmonic-Symphony (or, at least, the Philharmonic half of it, which merged with the younger New York Symphony Society in 1928) thus remains, even in these days of high costs and high deficits, a triumphant example of the public's willingness to maintain a cultural enterprise it believes in. Never since its reorganization on a large-scale basis in 1901 has the Philharmonic ended its season in the black, and never has it failed to continue operations the following season.

In the past, the Philharmonic has often faced and overcome problems as grave as any that confront it today. When Arturo Toscanini ended his brilliant reign as its conductor in 1936, the orchestra fell on evil days. John Barbirolli, a young and almost unknown English conductor, was given Toscanini's post. He was overwhelmed by a task that was still beyond him, and after four unhappy years of diminishing audiences and bad press notices returned to England, where he has since—as conductor of the celebrated Hallé Orchestra in Manchester—become an artist of considerable stature. Barbirolli was followed by Artur Rodzinski, who proved to be the disciplinarian the decayed ensemble needed, but indulged in such fits of temperament that he became *persona non grata* with the board and moved on in 1947 to an equally turbulent relationship with the Chicago Symphony Orchestra.

After the icy separation of Rodzinski and the management, the orchestra subsisted on guest conductors, with the elder statesman Bruno Walter as "musical adviser." But an orchestra always tends to go to pieces under a series of guest conductors, none of whom has undisputed authority or the power to hire and fire the men. In 1950, Mitropoulos was named conductor, though a good many weeks of the season are still turned over to such visitors as (this year) Szell, Walter and Toscanini's young Italian protégé, Guido Cantelli.

The orchestra's artistic output has been as changeable as its leadership. The 1901 reorganization occurred because routine programs and sloppy playing threatened it with extinction in the face of competition with the superior Boston Symphony. Ten years later, however, the orchestra was again put in the hands of an inferior conductor, Josef Stransky, who remained for 16 years and reduced the group to impotence with his desultory ways. The merger with the New York Symphony in 1928 once more brought new life into the organization, as two of the world's foremost musicians —William Mengelberg and Toscanini—were engaged to head it. Mengelberg left after three years, but Toscanini remained for nine, to give the orchestra the most brilliant interlude in its history.

Yet the maestro's policy was unsatisfactory in that he concentrated upon the established repertory at the expense of the new and experimental works that must be presented regularly by any musical institution in touch with its own times.

Under the Mitropoulos regime the orchestra is pursuing a far broader program policy. Although the box office responds most favorably to Brahms and Tchaikovsky symphonies and performances of standard concertos by famous soloists, the board of directors has been willing to underwrite a good many daring, and usually unprofitable, ventures. One by one Mitropoulos has acquainted his audience with the atonal works of Arnold Schoenberg, Alban Berg and Anton von Webern which have been neglected for 40 years by all the American orchestras, partly because audiences do not like them at first hearing and partly because conductors do not enjoy coping with their problems. He has also enriched the repertory with concert versions of operas—Milhaud's *Les Choéphores*, Ravel's *L'Heure Espagnole* and Berg's *Wozzeck* among them—that are too expensive and risky for the Metropolitan to give on the stage.

There are disadvantages, too, about Mitropoulos' work. Many of his week-in-week-out programs are innocuous, and his interpretations of the classics are often bloated and strained. But his aims are high and his purposes are progres-

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sive, and the Philharmonic's 5,000th concert finds the orchestra in good artistic health. CECIL SMITH

MOVIES

Big Jobs

THE NEW Samuel Goldwyn presentation is *I Want You*, directed by Mark Robson from a script by Irwin Shaw based on *New Yorker* stories by Edward Newhouse and offering a strong box-office cast led by Dana Andrews, Dorothy McQuire, Farley Granger and Peggy Dow. This is a Goldwyn personal super-effort.

As is customary when Hollywood has a "message," the picture is filmed on the average middle-class set, inhabited by average middle-class actors who talk in slick-magazine dialogue spiked with the tears of soap opera. This "sincere" lingo is arch, it is bathetic, it makes you afraid to say hello to your family when you get home at night. Hollywood is never seen at a worse moment than when it tries to reproduce the remarks of a man infatuated by the shape of his wife's nose.

The purpose of *I Want You* is to reconcile the public to the draft for the Cold War; not to explain the need for troops, just to make you "feel" it. It describes the sorrows and noble renunciations of the women, the stalwart response of the men when Uncle Sam calls. The picture makes a feature of touching departures and I lost count of the number of times the characters took leave of one another. As a nation, we discovered propaganda late in the day, but now we're shooting it into ourselves like dope fiends. We don't publish facts any more; we sell slogans. Goldwyn accordingly is doing only his patriotic duty, but I wonder if a country defends itself the better for being fed pink marshmallows until it retches.

One reason why Arthur Miller's *Death of a Salesman* was so popular in New York, Chicago and other centers of business enterprise was that it permitted living salesmen—and that includes most of us these days—to shiver pleasantly at their own narrow escapes. The screen version of the play, more explicit as to character and motive than the stage original, makes clear how we were able to evade the warning of Willy Loman and why as a tragedy, the play is dubious.

The Greek prerequisites for a tragic hero are not rigidly observed any more, but it is still true that if the protagonist is to move us, if in any degree he is to arouse fear and wonder in us, he must have some soul, some strength, some beauty. An idiot is not tragic, he is merely depressing, and from any moral viewpoint Willy Loman is an idiot. He is an abstract—and rather superficial—embodiment of salesmanship, completely false, completely dishonest, completely craven; in a proper tragedy he would be found as one of the furies tearing at the flesh of the hero. As a matter of fact, *Death of a Hero* could have a real hero in the person of Willy's wife. It is not entirely because Mildred Dunnock is a strong and evocative actress that she has made the part spring forward both on the stage and on the screen. Linda Loman is the true focus of the play and it is only by main force that our attention is kept on Willy.

Fredric March, rarely a thoughtful actor, plays the title role with his wings flapping and his feathers awry. He behaves as though he had watched Leo Cobb's stage work closely and determined to go him one better at every point. More exhausted at the beginning, more phony in the flashbacks, more insane in the present, March melodramatizes the emtpiness of the role and will probably win an Oscar.

As the elder son, Biff, Kevin McCarthy turns in the performance next best to Miss Dunnock's. He works intelligently with his material and the confusion in the part is not of his making; it arises from the fact that Miller has provided two different reasons for Biff's degeneration and it is thus impossible to decide whether he is to be played as a youth suffering from the corrosion of false ideals or the trauma of finding his father shacked up with a trollop. The picture has been well staged in a tone of dreary respectability that is more appropriate than the chic squalor of the play's stage set; it has been directed with efficient but mechanical competence by Laslo Benedek.

It is not possible to write a just review of Vittorio De Sica's *Miracle in Milan* for the reason that the picture, magnificent in details of visual comment that would be distorted and spoiled if they were described here, is weak in over-all purpose and structure, which could very well be described here. The only fair thing to do is to advise that you see it, observe how the outcasts greet the sun, how The Good Toto reconciles each man to his deformity, how evil can sometimes be made irresistibly funny, and decide perhaps that you have been repaid in such fragments for what you did not receive as a whole.

Miracle in Milan is a fantasy, a fairy tale, a modern morality with an old supernatural superstructure; the creator of *Shoe-Shine* and *The Bicycle Thief* does not apparently work at his best in that area of the imagination. The hero, an innocent almost literally drunk with goodness, has no need of, and gains no stature from the superhuman trappings that are hung upon him. On the evidence of the whole picture, it is impossible to say whether this hero is Christ or Aladdin or the Sorcerer's Apprentice, but it is possible to say that, playing him, Francesco Golisano has moments that are inspired and inspiring.

If you subject the picture to analysis, you will find that it lacks the consistency that fantasy demands. You will notice with some pain that the "special effects" are as creaky as the devices of old melodrama, and if you try to sum up the moral you will find that it seems to be pie in the sky. Nevertheless it is clear that, however confused the argument, naïve the machinery, weak the conclusion, the picture is rich in observations that are not confused, naïve or weak.

In short, De Sica is not Chaplin and he is not René Clair. I think he was mistaken to abandon his own field of impromptu reality shaped by moral conviction, but I am grateful for the mistake. ROBERT HATCH

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Adventure in Democracy

(*Continued from page 16*)

$8,400. The average income in India is $33.60 per year. The average Indian in order to be a member of the Parliament from the West Bengal Constituency must work for 250 years, and save every penny, in order to foot the bill for his campaign. After all, democracy is for the average man.

Altogether there will be around 175,000 polling booths. An average candidate for the Parliamentary seat would have to cover around 250 polling booths by appointing some 500 counting agents. If he were to send only a postcard to each voter in his average constituency of 720,000 voters, it would cost him in the neighborhood of $630. The Constitution provides that there will be in the Parliament not less than one member for every 750,000 and not more than one for every 500,000. Few qualifications for a candidate are prescribed. He must be a citizen of India. He must not be of unsound mind. He must not be holding an office of profit in the government or a government contract. He should not be a contractor or a managing agent in a corporation in which the government has any share. Even on the point of moral turpitude, the lawmakers have been quite generous. Unless a man has spent two years in jail after a conviction for a criminal offense, he is fit to be a member of Parliament.

On the election day, public meetings and canvassing will be banned. A candidate will not be allowed to use any conveyance in order to bring voters to the polling booth. Even two families cannot travel in the same car unless they have jointly paid the fare. In a way, this is all to the good. Otherwise, the ruling party, the Congress, would have placed rival groups at a disadvantage. It is not possible for a candidate for the Parliament to know personally each of his 720,000 potential backers. Nor is it possible for these many voters to know their candidates by their faces. An overwhelming majority of these voters will not be able to read the names of the candidates on the ballot boxes.

A system of symbols, therefore, has been evolved. Each party and each candidate is to be assigned a pictorial symbol. For instance, the ruling Congress Party has chosen two bulls with a yoke on as its symbol. The Praja Party has taken the hut as its standard. Socialists have picked out the tree to represent their group, while ears of corn and a sickle have fallen to the Communists' lot. Here are some other symbols recommended by the Chief Election Commissioner—human hand, cycle, ladder, boat, lamp, star, cart, flower, pitcher, cock, scales, elephant, camel. Symbols with religious associations are debarred by law, and yet individual candidates do not fail to exploit religious sentiments by drawing attention to certain implied associations. The ruling Congress Party has begun to describe its symbolic bull as the sacred mount of Shiva.

Illiterate voters will be voting for either an elephant or a camel or a cock, instead of voting for Shridharani, Nehru or Sita, or for a political party. But even this does not solve the problem. The meaning of even two-dimensional configuration does not come easy to those unaccustomed to seeing a printed page.

Here is an instance. The Chief Election Commissioner went to the village of Orissa for mock elections. He brought forth such pictorial symbols as depicting animals, those being considered the easiest. One villager described the camel as an elephant.

At another place, the villagers were taught to put a cross on their ballot papers and asked to put the slips in the slits of ballot boxes. Some villagers went in the booth, put their crosses on the ballot boxes themselves, pocketed the ballot papers and went home.

There used to be a platform routine when the British ruled India. They used to argue that India cannot be free unless its people are educated and trained in democratic processes. Indian patriots used to answer that more often than not, illiterate villagers of India have greater wisdom and worldly knowledge than the educated city-slickers. Only a few weeks are left to prove which of the two were correct.

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

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